Over on ConservativeHome: CentreRight, Daniel Hamilton has posted How would you reform the House of Lords?. This issue has rather gone off the boil for the time being, but cannot evade resolution forever. And I think it's about time the Conservative Party took a lead in constitutional reform, rather than adopting a "no change at all" position at the time and then having no ability to influence the outcome, then being unable to do anything more than complain at the result (see for instance Scottish devolution).
Last year I wrote a series of posts on second chambers looking at some of the upper houses in other parliamentary democracies to see if there is anything in them that could be copied. Some good ideas stand out, but what is also clear is that different countries use the second chamber for different things, which comes to the nub of the problem.
Fundamentally there are three questions about reform of the House of the Lords that need to be answered in order. They are:
1). What role in the system should the second chamber play?
2). What powers should it have?
3). How should it be composed?
Unfortunately nearly everyone dives on the third question and then spends forever debating such minutiae as the ratio of elected to appointed members, voting systems and constituencies rather than grappling with the first two.
But it is in answering the first two that will lead to the answer for the third. Now many upper houses around the world are part of federal systems, with the upper house designed as a states's rights chamber, to mirror the lower house reflecting the people. This is true of the Senate of Australia and the Bundesrat of Germany, and for that matter also of the Senate of Canada and the Rajya Sabha of India. Now this takes us into the difficult point that in the UK power is not evenly devolved and none of the four parts has the same level of power. This is not a federal country and so does not need a federal upper house.
Similarly it is often suggested that the upper house should be composed of representatives from local government (indeed Daniel suggests this in his own post). But does local government, primarily an administrative matter, really need such a direct link to the legislature?
The House of Lords may once have been a house to represent a key political interest group (the great landowners) but it has evolved into a chamber that primarily scrutinises and amends legislation, occasionally acting as a check on the powers of the lower house. This should remain the role post reform, answering the first question.
So what powers should it have? The first, and easiest to address, are those over supply (or the Budget). For a parliamentary democracy to function effectively there must be a single body that decides the government, including the crucial power of access to revenue. Anyone familiar with the 1975 Australian constitutional crisis will be aware of the mess that arose because both houses had power over the budget, resulting in a direct clash with the constitutional principle that governments live and die in the lower house. (One could, I suppose, give the power to a joint sitting of the two houses but it would have to be immediate.) It's notable that most upper houses founded in Westminster system democracies since 1911 have tended to have the supply powers restricted in precisely this way.
I would also have an assumption built in that if the two houses conflict then ultimately at the end of any dispute resolution procedure then either the overwhelming will of the Commons should prevail over the upper or the electorate should settle the matter. This will take more than a mere one year delay as presently in the Parliament Act. The starting point should be that if a bill can't get through the upper house it either dies or a special mechanism must be invoked that requires a more substantial threshold than a normal majority in the lower house to override it. Perhaps the Commons should have a 2/3 majority to override a bill failing in the upper house, or there should be a joint sitting (with the numbers in the upper house always deliberately smaller than the Commons) or perhaps each house can have the power to refer a bill directly to the people if the other house will not pass it. (After all if we're allowing the Commons the chance to get its way over the upper house, why not the reverse?) We may also give the upper house extra powers in particular areas. Currently it has an absolute veto over postponing general elections. What about giving it an absolute veto over all matters affecting the Commons, including voting systems, raising MPs's salaries and so forth? I admit this section is not as fully thought through as it could be, but there are several clear possibilities.
Finally we come to the composition. Again there's an easy starting point followed by a quick descent into murk. But it's notable that many upper houses around the world have staggered elections, so that the entire chamber is not elected in one go. This is a useful check against a sudden convulsion in the Commons and allows for the upper house to take a longer term view. Beyond this it gets murky.
As I said above, I don't think the upper house should be converted into a states's rights or local councils's chamber, so filling it with nominees from elsewhere in the system isn't in line with this. And since it wouldn't be aiming to represent a particular element I don't think a deliberate malapportionment such as an equal number of members per county (where London and the Isle of Wight would have parity!) would work. But what about an elected chamber that transcended the limitations of geographic representation?
It is here that I must acknowledge inspiration from the two Irish Seanads - the Irish Free State Seanad and the present Seanad Éireann. The former had a country wide election that resulted in some Senators being elected who represented particular groups in society who would not normally have been well represented in a constituency based system. The latter has both members elected by university graduates and members representing "Vocational Panels" that seek to represent the key strands in Irish society (Administration, Agriculture, Culture & Education, Labour and Industry & Commerce). Now the Vocational Panels have come in for criticism as being elected by party politicians and producing party politicians, but the university seats routinely elect independents and show a willingness amongst voters to not let the upper house be a total partisan walk-over.
Now a UK wide election for even eighty upper house members could get very messy if using a single constituency. But what if for the upper house voters could register as a member of one of a series of groupings, with each grouping electing a number of upper house members by postal vote using the Single Transferable Vote? (The concept of separate electoral rolls with choice as to which one is one is common - perhaps the best known example in the Anglosphere are the Māori seats in the Parliament of New Zealand.) A mechanism could be established to monitor the individual rolls and allow for the addition and removal of groupings as deemed necessary. Voters could vote by post to elect a proportion - say a third at a time - of the upper house. The nature of the upper house seats could encourage candidacies and voting on a different scale from the Commons, breaking the partisan deadlock and encouraging independent candidates with suitable backgrounds. And UK wide elections could help represent groups in society who frequently find they are too scattered and divided to be listened to in the Commons.
This would be a radical change for the upper house (we couldn't really carry on calling it "the Lords" so I guess "Senate" is as good a working title as any) but one that has very few elements that have not been tried and tested before. Maybe this could be the way forward...
Showing posts with label Second chambers. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Second chambers. Show all posts
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Sunday, December 02, 2007
On second chambers: The Japanese House of Councillors
After a much longer break than I'd planned, a return to my look at second chambers around the world. This time it's a look at the Japanese House of Councillors.
Composition: 242 members sitting for six year terms, with half elected at each election. 146 members are elected from the 47 prefectures by the Single Non-Transferable Vote and 96 from nationwide lists. It should be noted that this is not an Additional Member System but rather Parallel Voting where the results in one section of the election have no effect on the other.
Fairness of representation: The prefectures have quite a diversity of population, with the most populous, Tokyo having over twenty times the population of the least, Tottori. In a single election some prefectures elect one Councillor, others more than one and so consquently there's a malapportionment in favour of the smaller prefectures. The proportional element can water this down a little.
Powers and conventions: The House of Councillors is another of the stronger upper houses. It can consider almost all matters that the House of Representatives can; however in the event of deadlock between the two Houses the lower House can assert its will on budgets, treaties and the appointment of Prime Ministers after a period of time. On other matters it takes a two-thirds majority in the lower house to over-rule the upper.
Conflict resolution: In the event of a dispute between the two Houses, there is provision for time to reach agreement - 10 days for Prime Ministers, 30 days for treaties and budgets - then the decision of the House of Representatives is deemed to be the decision of the Diet as a whole.
For all other matters, if the House of Councillors either fails to pass a bill passed by the lower house within 60 days or passes unacceptable amendments then the House of Representatives can override the veto but it takes a two-thirds majority to do so.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: Both Houses are directly elected, albeit on different electoral systems and at different times. Consequently there's the option to split votes and elect a House of Councillors as a check & balance against an over powerful House of Representatives. It's rare for a single party or coalition to win a two-thirds majority in the lower house, although it did happen in the 2005 general election (which was called after the upper house voted down the privatisation of the post office). The most recent elections for the House of Councillors have seen control shift to the opposition, but so long as the Liberal Democratic Party and its allies the New Komeito Party maintain their two-thirds majority in the lower house then it seems the potential for gridlock is lessened. However the majority in the lower house is on a rare scale and a more normal majority would not be able to override an opposition majority in the upper house.
Anything else?: Not much more as the above covers the main features.
Anything worth copying?: Once again there's the benefit of split elections, so the question of which house has the greater legitimacy is removed. There's a clear mechanism to resolve a conflict between the two houses. It's also not possible for the upper house to bring down the government, a problem noted with the Australian Senate. On the other hand the prefectural system is something that doesn't have an obvious parallel in the UK, and the malapportionment may be hard to stomach, whilst the Single Non-Transferable Vote is one of the most complicated electoral systems to understand and very prone to attempts to manipulate it.
Composition: 242 members sitting for six year terms, with half elected at each election. 146 members are elected from the 47 prefectures by the Single Non-Transferable Vote and 96 from nationwide lists. It should be noted that this is not an Additional Member System but rather Parallel Voting where the results in one section of the election have no effect on the other.
Fairness of representation: The prefectures have quite a diversity of population, with the most populous, Tokyo having over twenty times the population of the least, Tottori. In a single election some prefectures elect one Councillor, others more than one and so consquently there's a malapportionment in favour of the smaller prefectures. The proportional element can water this down a little.
Powers and conventions: The House of Councillors is another of the stronger upper houses. It can consider almost all matters that the House of Representatives can; however in the event of deadlock between the two Houses the lower House can assert its will on budgets, treaties and the appointment of Prime Ministers after a period of time. On other matters it takes a two-thirds majority in the lower house to over-rule the upper.
Conflict resolution: In the event of a dispute between the two Houses, there is provision for time to reach agreement - 10 days for Prime Ministers, 30 days for treaties and budgets - then the decision of the House of Representatives is deemed to be the decision of the Diet as a whole.
For all other matters, if the House of Councillors either fails to pass a bill passed by the lower house within 60 days or passes unacceptable amendments then the House of Representatives can override the veto but it takes a two-thirds majority to do so.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: Both Houses are directly elected, albeit on different electoral systems and at different times. Consequently there's the option to split votes and elect a House of Councillors as a check & balance against an over powerful House of Representatives. It's rare for a single party or coalition to win a two-thirds majority in the lower house, although it did happen in the 2005 general election (which was called after the upper house voted down the privatisation of the post office). The most recent elections for the House of Councillors have seen control shift to the opposition, but so long as the Liberal Democratic Party and its allies the New Komeito Party maintain their two-thirds majority in the lower house then it seems the potential for gridlock is lessened. However the majority in the lower house is on a rare scale and a more normal majority would not be able to override an opposition majority in the upper house.
Anything else?: Not much more as the above covers the main features.
Anything worth copying?: Once again there's the benefit of split elections, so the question of which house has the greater legitimacy is removed. There's a clear mechanism to resolve a conflict between the two houses. It's also not possible for the upper house to bring down the government, a problem noted with the Australian Senate. On the other hand the prefectural system is something that doesn't have an obvious parallel in the UK, and the malapportionment may be hard to stomach, whilst the Single Non-Transferable Vote is one of the most complicated electoral systems to understand and very prone to attempts to manipulate it.
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
So is STV easy to use?
There's been several posts related to Australia lately - I guess that's what Googling the elections can do to you! But before I turn my attention homeward I've just been glancing at the Australian Electoral Commission: 2007 Federal Election - Candidates details and Senate preference flows website. This rather dry sounding page lists all the candidates for the election including the Senate which is elected by single transferable vote. (For more details see my past post On second chambers: The Senate of Australia.)
One thing that stands out above all else is that the ballot papers can be HUGE. The candidates in New South Wales are no less than seventy-nine.
How are voters supposed to be informed about every single one of these candidates so they can work out an order of preferences for all seventy-nine candidates? Even the most ardent follower of politics would find this task hard.
Of course there are two ways round this. One is to pick a few candidates you like then number the rest in the order they appear on the ballot - a donkey vote. Alternatively they can "vote above the line" which is to select just one box for a party, and their vote will be allocated in accordance with one of the party preference tickets submitted (also available on the site).
Curiously most of the ardent STV advocates in this country who are aware of how the Australian system works are fiercely critical of making it easier to cast a valid vote. Would they rather have lots of donkey and spoilt votes?
One thing that stands out above all else is that the ballot papers can be HUGE. The candidates in New South Wales are no less than seventy-nine.
How are voters supposed to be informed about every single one of these candidates so they can work out an order of preferences for all seventy-nine candidates? Even the most ardent follower of politics would find this task hard.
Of course there are two ways round this. One is to pick a few candidates you like then number the rest in the order they appear on the ballot - a donkey vote. Alternatively they can "vote above the line" which is to select just one box for a party, and their vote will be allocated in accordance with one of the party preference tickets submitted (also available on the site).
Curiously most of the ardent STV advocates in this country who are aware of how the Australian system works are fiercely critical of making it easier to cast a valid vote. Would they rather have lots of donkey and spoilt votes?
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
On second chambers: The Bundesrat of Germany
Continuing my look at second chambers around the world, we now turn to look at the Bundesrat of Germany.
Composition: 69 votes. Members are appointed by the Länder (state) cabinets and are invariably members of the cabinet, headed by the Ministerpräsidents (state premiers). In theory a Länder can appoint a single delegate. Votes are allocated in proportion to a state's population, with between three and six per state. There is an upper limit of 6 votes per state. Each state casts a single block vote.
Fairness of representation: This is a curious set-up for by and away the most explicit "representing the states" upper house I've looked at so far. And yet voting power is rooted in population size, rather than the equal votes for each state model in Australia. The allocation is slightly biased to the smaller states. As each state casts a block vote (a split delegation abstains but this de facto is a no vote) the principle that members are voting on behalf of what their states want is upheld, though as the state and federal party systems are much the same the potential for partisan voting is still present.
Powers and conventions: All legislation must be introduced in the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat has the power to block legislation in all policy areas that the Basic Law (constitution) grants power to the Länder or where the Länder have to administer federal regulations. (This proportion has grown - from 10% in 1949 to about 60% in 1993.)
On other legislation the Bundesrat has a temporary veto that can be overturned by a further vote of the Bundestag. If the Bundesrat blocks something with a 2/3 majority the Bundestag needs a 2/3 vote to overturn it.
Conflict resolution: For federal only matters, there is the mechanism for the Bundestag to overturn the Bundesrat's block. If the absolute veto is wielded then either house or the government can convene a committee to work negotiate a compromise. That compromise must be passed by both houses, but neither can amend it. There is no mechanism to dissolve the Bundesrat. Consequently when it has an opposition party majority then a stalemate can occur.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: One problem in recent years has been the tendency for opposition parties to use the Bundesrat as a way to frustrate the government of the day, rather than to protect the interests of the states. However as the Länder have competency in the areas where they have an absolute veto then requiring explicit consent is a way to prevent conflicts between the two. The Bundesrat does have strong powers so can take a stand against a majority in the Bundestag, though can not totally block it.
Anything else?: There have been calls to move to a system of directly electing the Bundesrat, similar to the Australian Senate. The German constitution explicitly bars referendums and plebiscites on any matter bar changes to Länder borders, so there is no option to put a contentious matter directly to the people to break a stalemate.
(Although not directly covering the Bundesrat, one notable feature of the German system of government is that the Chancellor can only be removed from office by a constructive vote of no confidence, which must nominate a successor to have effect. So unlike the Australian system, with all the problems exposed in the 1975 constitutional crisis, the German government's survival cannot be threatened by the upper house.)
Anything worth copying?: To be honest very little at the moment. The UK isn't yet fully federal and would need devolution in all four parts, with each chamber wielding equal power, in order for the similar powers to work. Devolved parliaments sending a ministerial delegation to an upper house to cast a block vote is remarkably similar to the EU Council of Ministers and likely to provoke many of the same objections. The dispute mechanism is also rather weak in producing an outcome. And without the provision for a matter the two houses can't agree on to be put to the people, whether directly through a referendum or by a new election for both houses, there isn't a way to overcome some of the stalemates.
Composition: 69 votes. Members are appointed by the Länder (state) cabinets and are invariably members of the cabinet, headed by the Ministerpräsidents (state premiers). In theory a Länder can appoint a single delegate. Votes are allocated in proportion to a state's population, with between three and six per state. There is an upper limit of 6 votes per state. Each state casts a single block vote.
Fairness of representation: This is a curious set-up for by and away the most explicit "representing the states" upper house I've looked at so far. And yet voting power is rooted in population size, rather than the equal votes for each state model in Australia. The allocation is slightly biased to the smaller states. As each state casts a block vote (a split delegation abstains but this de facto is a no vote) the principle that members are voting on behalf of what their states want is upheld, though as the state and federal party systems are much the same the potential for partisan voting is still present.
Powers and conventions: All legislation must be introduced in the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat has the power to block legislation in all policy areas that the Basic Law (constitution) grants power to the Länder or where the Länder have to administer federal regulations. (This proportion has grown - from 10% in 1949 to about 60% in 1993.)
On other legislation the Bundesrat has a temporary veto that can be overturned by a further vote of the Bundestag. If the Bundesrat blocks something with a 2/3 majority the Bundestag needs a 2/3 vote to overturn it.
Conflict resolution: For federal only matters, there is the mechanism for the Bundestag to overturn the Bundesrat's block. If the absolute veto is wielded then either house or the government can convene a committee to work negotiate a compromise. That compromise must be passed by both houses, but neither can amend it. There is no mechanism to dissolve the Bundesrat. Consequently when it has an opposition party majority then a stalemate can occur.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: One problem in recent years has been the tendency for opposition parties to use the Bundesrat as a way to frustrate the government of the day, rather than to protect the interests of the states. However as the Länder have competency in the areas where they have an absolute veto then requiring explicit consent is a way to prevent conflicts between the two. The Bundesrat does have strong powers so can take a stand against a majority in the Bundestag, though can not totally block it.
Anything else?: There have been calls to move to a system of directly electing the Bundesrat, similar to the Australian Senate. The German constitution explicitly bars referendums and plebiscites on any matter bar changes to Länder borders, so there is no option to put a contentious matter directly to the people to break a stalemate.
(Although not directly covering the Bundesrat, one notable feature of the German system of government is that the Chancellor can only be removed from office by a constructive vote of no confidence, which must nominate a successor to have effect. So unlike the Australian system, with all the problems exposed in the 1975 constitutional crisis, the German government's survival cannot be threatened by the upper house.)
Anything worth copying?: To be honest very little at the moment. The UK isn't yet fully federal and would need devolution in all four parts, with each chamber wielding equal power, in order for the similar powers to work. Devolved parliaments sending a ministerial delegation to an upper house to cast a block vote is remarkably similar to the EU Council of Ministers and likely to provoke many of the same objections. The dispute mechanism is also rather weak in producing an outcome. And without the provision for a matter the two houses can't agree on to be put to the people, whether directly through a referendum or by a new election for both houses, there isn't a way to overcome some of the stalemates.
Friday, August 03, 2007
On second chambers: The Senate of Australia
Continuing my look at second chambers around the world, we now turn to look at the Australian Senate.
Composition: 76 members. 12 from each of the six states and two from the two territories, elected as follows:
*Under the normal electoral cycle: Only 6 of the senators from each state are elected at each "half-election", serving for two three year terms. All the Senators from the territories are elected in a normal "half-election". The terms are fixed; however the timing of the elections is sufficiently flexible that most elections for the House of Representatives are timed to overlap with a Senate election.
*In a "double dissolution": As part of the conflict resolution mechanism (which I'll come to below), the entire Senate is dissolved and put up for re-election, alongside the House of Representatives.
Election is by Single Transferable Vote. The number of candidates can immense - at the last election there were 78 standing in New South Wales. Australia has compulsory voting and it is compulsory for a voter to deploy all their preferences. A voter has two ways to cast a vote. They either rank all candidates in order of preference (yes even if there are 78!), and remember they've also just preferenced a House vote. Now you can understand the value of "How To Vote" cards recommending an order of preference. Or they can formally opt to have their vote redistributed in accordance with an order lodged by a party - for this they just mark a box "above the line". It's controversial in some quarters, especially due to horse trading, but frankly it's just a quicker way to vote the way a party suggests than copying out the How To Vote card.
The other point of note is how mid-term vacancies are filled. Until 1977 a state legislature would just appoint a replacement, with an unwritten convention that they appoint the nominee of the ex Senator's party. In 1975 (and we'll be hearing a lot about 1975 as we go) this convention was breached twice (and altered the balance of power in the Senate). A 1977 constitutional amendment now requires the new Senator to be from the same party, but doesn't require them to be the party's nominee. And some state legislatures have just declined to appoint a new Senator, leaving the seat vacant.
Fairness of representation: As I've said before, it's not always clear exactly what is the basis of representation in upper houses so the term "malapportionment" is best avoided. Depending upon how you look at it, the Senate either has a very fair representation for the states, with all having the same number of Senators, or a very bad voter-representative ratio with Senators from Tasmania representing an electorate many times smaller than those from New South Wales.
In a federal system a bicameral legislature with one chamber based on equal representation for the people and the other on equal representation for the states has some merits. However as the Senate is directly elected (as opposed to, say, the Bundesrat in Germany, which I'll look at in another post) and partisan it's questionable as to whether or not Senators are always acting in the interests of their state or their party.
The territories are the weak point in this as they don't get equal representation (but have even smaller populations). And when the Northern Territory was offered statehood in a referendum in 1998 it was only offered 3 Senators, rather than 12. What would be patently unfair would be for the original states to have more Senators just because they were the first in the federation.
Powers and conventions: The Senate is extremely powerful by the standards of second chambers and it's not for nothing that the term "Washminster System" is sometimes used in place of Westminster System. The Senate has near equal powers to the House of Representatives. Budgets ("Supply") and Appropriation Bills must originate in the House and cannot be amended by the Senate, but otherwise the Senate is in quite a strong position. It can reject Bills outright, unless the government initiates the double dissolution process (again, more on this later).
One particular point of note is that the Senate has the power to reject Supply. This is one of the most contentious matters. In practice the Senate has almost always not exercised the powers, and for most of the last 32 years the Senate has either been controlled by the government of the day or had the balance of power held by a party with an explicit stance against exercising the power to block Supply.
But in 1975, the one year in which the Senate did block Supply, constitutional chaos ensued. Strictly speaking the Senate didn't vote down Supply but rather passed deferral motions and set on a confrontational course with the House of Representatives and the government, who held office by virtue of their majority there.
Conflict resolution: A formal mechanism is built in, with the presumption that the House will prevail if it's the will of the people. If the Senate repeatedly refuses to pass a Bill, the government can advise the Governor General to call a double dissolution in which both the House and Senate face re-election by the people. (In practice a government will store up several bills and take them all to the people in one double dissolution.) Then a special joint session of House and Senate is called and the final fate of the Bills is settled there. The House generally has about double the number of members the Senate has, so is expected to prevail in a joint sitting. (In practice only one joint sitting has been held, in 1974, with the other double dissolutions leading to either the incumbent government losing power, gaining a majority in the Senate or not having the numbers to win a joint sitting.)
The situation in 1975 was more complicated, with both the Senate and government of Gough Whitlam standing firm. Whitlam asserted the Senate were challenging the more legitimate House and should pass the Budget, the Liberal-Country controlled Senate demanded a new election in the hope of gaining power for themselves. In the end the Governor General dismissed Whitlam and appointed the Liberal leader, Malcolm Fraser, as Prime Minister. This was the most controversial event in the political history of Australia and ever since there has been no real consensus on a way to resolve the issues involved.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: A tricky one this. In recent years the Senate has generally had no one party majority (although the last election proved a narrow exception) and so governments have not had free reign. However when an opposition party can secure a majority - and as well as at an election this can happen if state legislatures refuse to appoint replacement senators for government vacancies - then it can set on a course on confrontation.
Since the double dissolution takes the entire Parliament, house and both halves of the Senate et al, to the electorate it is in theory hard for the Senate to frustrate the will of the people long term. However if the elected government doesn't have a majority in the new Senate or the numbers to win in a joint sitting then it can't get its way. This should be because of ticket splitting and voter caution, though given the different voter-representative ratios in the Senate it is entirely possible for every voter to vote the same way for both chambers and still return different majorities.
And of course 1975 shows the dangers when a Senate feels confident to take on the House and both government & Senate adopt a strategy of waiting for the other side to crack.
Anything else?: Everything above here pretty much sums it up. But see the end of the piece for more about 1975 for those who don't know the full gory story.
Anything worth copying?: Hmm... Staggered elections, multi-member constituencies and stronger powers with a clearly defined resolution mechanism are all very attractive. Less attractive is the ability to block supply and drive a government from office, but that could easily be denied in the creation of UK chamber. However the model of the chamber is very clearly one of representing clearly defined interests, not revising, and as the UK is not fully federal then these interests would be very hard to define. I can't envisage a chamber based on equal representation from England and Northern Ireland (to take the two extreme) would be workable. Equally I can't see giving the poorly defined English regions an equal number of members would be too popular with Scotland, Wales & Northern Ireland, and even within England there's also the issue of regions with smaller populations like the North East having the same number of members as the South East.
But the principle of an "equal say" second chamber could at least be a way to tackle other issues like the West Lothian Question.
Post Script: I've made many mentions of the events of 1975 so for those who aren't familiar with them, I'd recommend a look at Wikipedia: 1975 Australian constitutional crisis.
And also here's a special bonus feature from YouTube, featuring the satirical character Norman Gunston on that momentous day:
Composition: 76 members. 12 from each of the six states and two from the two territories, elected as follows:
*Under the normal electoral cycle: Only 6 of the senators from each state are elected at each "half-election", serving for two three year terms. All the Senators from the territories are elected in a normal "half-election". The terms are fixed; however the timing of the elections is sufficiently flexible that most elections for the House of Representatives are timed to overlap with a Senate election.
*In a "double dissolution": As part of the conflict resolution mechanism (which I'll come to below), the entire Senate is dissolved and put up for re-election, alongside the House of Representatives.
Election is by Single Transferable Vote. The number of candidates can immense - at the last election there were 78 standing in New South Wales. Australia has compulsory voting and it is compulsory for a voter to deploy all their preferences. A voter has two ways to cast a vote. They either rank all candidates in order of preference (yes even if there are 78!), and remember they've also just preferenced a House vote. Now you can understand the value of "How To Vote" cards recommending an order of preference. Or they can formally opt to have their vote redistributed in accordance with an order lodged by a party - for this they just mark a box "above the line". It's controversial in some quarters, especially due to horse trading, but frankly it's just a quicker way to vote the way a party suggests than copying out the How To Vote card.
The other point of note is how mid-term vacancies are filled. Until 1977 a state legislature would just appoint a replacement, with an unwritten convention that they appoint the nominee of the ex Senator's party. In 1975 (and we'll be hearing a lot about 1975 as we go) this convention was breached twice (and altered the balance of power in the Senate). A 1977 constitutional amendment now requires the new Senator to be from the same party, but doesn't require them to be the party's nominee. And some state legislatures have just declined to appoint a new Senator, leaving the seat vacant.
Fairness of representation: As I've said before, it's not always clear exactly what is the basis of representation in upper houses so the term "malapportionment" is best avoided. Depending upon how you look at it, the Senate either has a very fair representation for the states, with all having the same number of Senators, or a very bad voter-representative ratio with Senators from Tasmania representing an electorate many times smaller than those from New South Wales.
In a federal system a bicameral legislature with one chamber based on equal representation for the people and the other on equal representation for the states has some merits. However as the Senate is directly elected (as opposed to, say, the Bundesrat in Germany, which I'll look at in another post) and partisan it's questionable as to whether or not Senators are always acting in the interests of their state or their party.
The territories are the weak point in this as they don't get equal representation (but have even smaller populations). And when the Northern Territory was offered statehood in a referendum in 1998 it was only offered 3 Senators, rather than 12. What would be patently unfair would be for the original states to have more Senators just because they were the first in the federation.
Powers and conventions: The Senate is extremely powerful by the standards of second chambers and it's not for nothing that the term "Washminster System" is sometimes used in place of Westminster System. The Senate has near equal powers to the House of Representatives. Budgets ("Supply") and Appropriation Bills must originate in the House and cannot be amended by the Senate, but otherwise the Senate is in quite a strong position. It can reject Bills outright, unless the government initiates the double dissolution process (again, more on this later).
One particular point of note is that the Senate has the power to reject Supply. This is one of the most contentious matters. In practice the Senate has almost always not exercised the powers, and for most of the last 32 years the Senate has either been controlled by the government of the day or had the balance of power held by a party with an explicit stance against exercising the power to block Supply.
But in 1975, the one year in which the Senate did block Supply, constitutional chaos ensued. Strictly speaking the Senate didn't vote down Supply but rather passed deferral motions and set on a confrontational course with the House of Representatives and the government, who held office by virtue of their majority there.
Conflict resolution: A formal mechanism is built in, with the presumption that the House will prevail if it's the will of the people. If the Senate repeatedly refuses to pass a Bill, the government can advise the Governor General to call a double dissolution in which both the House and Senate face re-election by the people. (In practice a government will store up several bills and take them all to the people in one double dissolution.) Then a special joint session of House and Senate is called and the final fate of the Bills is settled there. The House generally has about double the number of members the Senate has, so is expected to prevail in a joint sitting. (In practice only one joint sitting has been held, in 1974, with the other double dissolutions leading to either the incumbent government losing power, gaining a majority in the Senate or not having the numbers to win a joint sitting.)
The situation in 1975 was more complicated, with both the Senate and government of Gough Whitlam standing firm. Whitlam asserted the Senate were challenging the more legitimate House and should pass the Budget, the Liberal-Country controlled Senate demanded a new election in the hope of gaining power for themselves. In the end the Governor General dismissed Whitlam and appointed the Liberal leader, Malcolm Fraser, as Prime Minister. This was the most controversial event in the political history of Australia and ever since there has been no real consensus on a way to resolve the issues involved.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: A tricky one this. In recent years the Senate has generally had no one party majority (although the last election proved a narrow exception) and so governments have not had free reign. However when an opposition party can secure a majority - and as well as at an election this can happen if state legislatures refuse to appoint replacement senators for government vacancies - then it can set on a course on confrontation.
Since the double dissolution takes the entire Parliament, house and both halves of the Senate et al, to the electorate it is in theory hard for the Senate to frustrate the will of the people long term. However if the elected government doesn't have a majority in the new Senate or the numbers to win in a joint sitting then it can't get its way. This should be because of ticket splitting and voter caution, though given the different voter-representative ratios in the Senate it is entirely possible for every voter to vote the same way for both chambers and still return different majorities.
And of course 1975 shows the dangers when a Senate feels confident to take on the House and both government & Senate adopt a strategy of waiting for the other side to crack.
Anything else?: Everything above here pretty much sums it up. But see the end of the piece for more about 1975 for those who don't know the full gory story.
Anything worth copying?: Hmm... Staggered elections, multi-member constituencies and stronger powers with a clearly defined resolution mechanism are all very attractive. Less attractive is the ability to block supply and drive a government from office, but that could easily be denied in the creation of UK chamber. However the model of the chamber is very clearly one of representing clearly defined interests, not revising, and as the UK is not fully federal then these interests would be very hard to define. I can't envisage a chamber based on equal representation from England and Northern Ireland (to take the two extreme) would be workable. Equally I can't see giving the poorly defined English regions an equal number of members would be too popular with Scotland, Wales & Northern Ireland, and even within England there's also the issue of regions with smaller populations like the North East having the same number of members as the South East.
But the principle of an "equal say" second chamber could at least be a way to tackle other issues like the West Lothian Question.
Post Script: I've made many mentions of the events of 1975 so for those who aren't familiar with them, I'd recommend a look at Wikipedia: 1975 Australian constitutional crisis.
And also here's a special bonus feature from YouTube, featuring the satirical character Norman Gunston on that momentous day:
Friday, July 27, 2007
On second chambers: Seanad Éireann
In the latest installment of my look at second chambers around the world, it's time now to look at Seanad Éireann in the Republic of Ireland. As I write this the new Seanad is in the process of being chosen, with two of the three sections now complete. (See Wikipedia: Members of the 23rd Seanad for the full list of members.)
Composition: 60 members chosen as follows:
* 11 members nominated by the Taoiseach
* 3 members elected by graduates of the University of Dublin/Trinity College, Dublin (they're basically the same thing) by Single Transferable Vote
* 3 members elected by graduates of the National University of Ireland by Single Transferable Vote
* 43 members nominated from five special panels ("Vocational Panels"), with nominations made by either members of the Oireachtas (the whole Parliament) or by relevant organisations connected with the field, and elected by TDs, outgoing Senators and local councillors). Single Transferable Vote is used for the elections, but with voting papers each worth 1000 to allow for greater fractions. The panels break down as follows:
**7 from the Administrative Panel
**11 from the Agricultural Panel
**5 from the Cultural and Educational Panel
**11 from the Labour Panel
**9 from the Industrial and Commercial Panel
One other point of note is that recent Taoisigh have followed a policy of nominating at least one Senator from Northern Ireland.
Fairness of representation: Where do we begin?
The university constituencies don't cover all tertiary level institutions. Many question why only university graduates can directly elect Senators, not all citizens. It seems graduates living abroad can vote - indeed many graduates in Northern Ireland are known to exercise their vote. (Don't ask me if someone with degrees from both institutions can vote in both!)
The vocational panels is an interesting idea and in many ways is arguably more socially unifying than the British Parliament. Rather than a division on the basis of station in society, the Seanad is based on the idea of co-operation and interdependence in society. Of course it's not too clear if the current division of panels reflects modern Irish society correctly. The nomination process is much critised, especially as some nominating organisations are very obscure. And as party politicians are voting to (s)elect the Senators, it's unsurprising that they mainly elect party politicians. All of the 43 panel Senators just elected are party politicians. Smaller parties sometimes band together to increase their voting power - one such deal between Labour and Sinn Féin has given the latter their first Senator.
Having eleven Senators nominated by the Taoiseach usually guarantees the government of the day a majority in the Seanad as almost all nominees are from the governing parties bar a Northern nominee, although in 1994 the government changed mid Dail and the new Taoiseach was unable to replace his predecessor's nominees. My British readers (at least) will understand my scepticism about the wisdom of letting prime ministers directly appoint members of a parliament.
(See also Seanad Éireann Committee on Procedure and Privileges Sub-Committee on Seanad Reform: 2004 Report - be warned, it's a PDF.)
Powers and conventions: The Seanad is primarily a revising body with only powers to delay. If a Bill passed by the Dail is not passed by the Seanad within 90 days, the Dail has a further 180 days to resolve that it has been "deemed" to be passed by the Seanad. Money bills can only be delayed 21 days. The government has the power to reduce the time limit for "urgent" bills with the concurrence of the President, but this can't apply to bills to change the constitution.
The Seanad can request that the President appoint a Committee of Privileges to decide whether or not a bill is a money bill. A majority of senators together with at least a third of the Dail can petition the President that a bill is of "great national importance" and ask them to decline to sign a bill into law until it has been "referred to the people" through either a referendum or new general election.
Conflict resolution: As the Seanad usually has a built in government majority, conflict is rare, but the 1994-1997 government (which did not have the support of the nominees) did not encounter many problems. The inherent assumption is that the Dail is supreme and the Seanad's powers to take on the Dail are strictly limited. The right to petition for a referendum is a watered down version of the power to call a referendum that the Irish Free State Seanad originally had.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: Since the majority in the Dail can usually secure a majority in the Seanad and the powers are loaded in favour of the Dail, there's little the Seanad can do to stand up to Dail abuses of power. The option to petition for a referendum might prove handy, although could the President just decline the request?
Anything else?: The report on Seanad Reform linked to above makes for interesting reading, offering potential justifications for several of the current members - the university Senators are usually independent and nomination by Taoiseach seems the best workable way to represent Northern Ireland and other minority groups - but criticising others, particularly the panel system.
The issue of representing Northern Ireland is worth a little further analysis, not because I think it should join the Republic but because the way Diasporas are represented in parliaments is often a complex one. Recently specific seats for expatriates have been created in the Italian Parliament, bringing this question to the forefront. However I am sceptical as to whether an upper house alone is the best place to resolve this issue, and don't feel that prime ministerial nominations should be retained just to solve it. Any solution to the "wider nation" problem should cover both houses.
One point of note is that a lot of Irish politicians have served in the Seanad either at the start of their career or midway, after losing their Dail seat. The image of the Seanad as a back-up route to the Oireachtas, or worse a source of sinecures for unsuccessful politicians, is not an attractive one.
Anything worth copying?: To be honest not much, although the panels may be an idea worth investigating more, but the present electoral system just produces a house of politicians, many of them seeking a Dail seat in the next election. The current Seanad was created by Éamon de Valera to be a much weaker body than its predecessor and it shows. But as a means to represent a society in a unified fashion, rather than dividing it up along class or religious grounds, it can be commended for its boldness of thinking.
Composition: 60 members chosen as follows:
* 11 members nominated by the Taoiseach
* 3 members elected by graduates of the University of Dublin/Trinity College, Dublin (they're basically the same thing) by Single Transferable Vote
* 3 members elected by graduates of the National University of Ireland by Single Transferable Vote
* 43 members nominated from five special panels ("Vocational Panels"), with nominations made by either members of the Oireachtas (the whole Parliament) or by relevant organisations connected with the field, and elected by TDs, outgoing Senators and local councillors). Single Transferable Vote is used for the elections, but with voting papers each worth 1000 to allow for greater fractions. The panels break down as follows:
**7 from the Administrative Panel
**11 from the Agricultural Panel
**5 from the Cultural and Educational Panel
**11 from the Labour Panel
**9 from the Industrial and Commercial Panel
One other point of note is that recent Taoisigh have followed a policy of nominating at least one Senator from Northern Ireland.
Fairness of representation: Where do we begin?
The university constituencies don't cover all tertiary level institutions. Many question why only university graduates can directly elect Senators, not all citizens. It seems graduates living abroad can vote - indeed many graduates in Northern Ireland are known to exercise their vote. (Don't ask me if someone with degrees from both institutions can vote in both!)
The vocational panels is an interesting idea and in many ways is arguably more socially unifying than the British Parliament. Rather than a division on the basis of station in society, the Seanad is based on the idea of co-operation and interdependence in society. Of course it's not too clear if the current division of panels reflects modern Irish society correctly. The nomination process is much critised, especially as some nominating organisations are very obscure. And as party politicians are voting to (s)elect the Senators, it's unsurprising that they mainly elect party politicians. All of the 43 panel Senators just elected are party politicians. Smaller parties sometimes band together to increase their voting power - one such deal between Labour and Sinn Féin has given the latter their first Senator.
Having eleven Senators nominated by the Taoiseach usually guarantees the government of the day a majority in the Seanad as almost all nominees are from the governing parties bar a Northern nominee, although in 1994 the government changed mid Dail and the new Taoiseach was unable to replace his predecessor's nominees. My British readers (at least) will understand my scepticism about the wisdom of letting prime ministers directly appoint members of a parliament.
(See also Seanad Éireann Committee on Procedure and Privileges Sub-Committee on Seanad Reform: 2004 Report - be warned, it's a PDF.)
Powers and conventions: The Seanad is primarily a revising body with only powers to delay. If a Bill passed by the Dail is not passed by the Seanad within 90 days, the Dail has a further 180 days to resolve that it has been "deemed" to be passed by the Seanad. Money bills can only be delayed 21 days. The government has the power to reduce the time limit for "urgent" bills with the concurrence of the President, but this can't apply to bills to change the constitution.
The Seanad can request that the President appoint a Committee of Privileges to decide whether or not a bill is a money bill. A majority of senators together with at least a third of the Dail can petition the President that a bill is of "great national importance" and ask them to decline to sign a bill into law until it has been "referred to the people" through either a referendum or new general election.
Conflict resolution: As the Seanad usually has a built in government majority, conflict is rare, but the 1994-1997 government (which did not have the support of the nominees) did not encounter many problems. The inherent assumption is that the Dail is supreme and the Seanad's powers to take on the Dail are strictly limited. The right to petition for a referendum is a watered down version of the power to call a referendum that the Irish Free State Seanad originally had.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: Since the majority in the Dail can usually secure a majority in the Seanad and the powers are loaded in favour of the Dail, there's little the Seanad can do to stand up to Dail abuses of power. The option to petition for a referendum might prove handy, although could the President just decline the request?
Anything else?: The report on Seanad Reform linked to above makes for interesting reading, offering potential justifications for several of the current members - the university Senators are usually independent and nomination by Taoiseach seems the best workable way to represent Northern Ireland and other minority groups - but criticising others, particularly the panel system.
The issue of representing Northern Ireland is worth a little further analysis, not because I think it should join the Republic but because the way Diasporas are represented in parliaments is often a complex one. Recently specific seats for expatriates have been created in the Italian Parliament, bringing this question to the forefront. However I am sceptical as to whether an upper house alone is the best place to resolve this issue, and don't feel that prime ministerial nominations should be retained just to solve it. Any solution to the "wider nation" problem should cover both houses.
One point of note is that a lot of Irish politicians have served in the Seanad either at the start of their career or midway, after losing their Dail seat. The image of the Seanad as a back-up route to the Oireachtas, or worse a source of sinecures for unsuccessful politicians, is not an attractive one.
Anything worth copying?: To be honest not much, although the panels may be an idea worth investigating more, but the present electoral system just produces a house of politicians, many of them seeking a Dail seat in the next election. The current Seanad was created by Éamon de Valera to be a much weaker body than its predecessor and it shows. But as a means to represent a society in a unified fashion, rather than dividing it up along class or religious grounds, it can be commended for its boldness of thinking.
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
On second chambers: The Irish Free State Seanad
Continuing my look at second chambers, and following some of the comments on my post about the Senate of Northern Ireland we now turn to the rest of Ireland. I'll come to the present Seanad in my next post in this series, but first I'd like to take a look at the Seanad in the Irish Free State, now known as "1st Seanad" (with the numbering for the current Senate starting from "2nd Seanad"). (For consistency I'm using "Seanad" rather than "Senate" throughout.)
Be warned that some of this is complicated as despite only lasting fourteen years it was subject to several constitutional amendments and effectively had three different (s)election systems over six elections in its life.
Composition: Start-up: 30 members elected by Dáil Éireann, with terms of three or nine years allocated by lot. 30 members appointed by the prime minister for six or twelve year terms. These arrangements were just to get things going.
As originally envisaged for permanent running: Members would serve for twelve years, with a third (fifteen) directly elected in a state wide Single Transferable Vote election.
The nomination process was complicated to say the least. Candidates would be nominated in three sections - senators up for re-election could renominate themselves; the Seanad as a whole then selected an equal number of candidates from a list submitted; and then the Dail selected a number equal to both the renominations and Seanad selection. (See Northern Ireland Elections: "An exceedingly severe test" - The Irish Senate elections of 1925 for more details of the one election that did take place.) Interim vacancies were filled by a vote of the Seanad; however the Senator would only serve until the next set of Seanad elections. (Also candidates had to be at least 35.)
Following changes in 1928: Direct elections were done away with and terms reduced to 9 years. The Seanad was now elected by thirds, with the outgoing Seanad and the Dail jointly voting by STV. The nominations were also changed so there would now be twice as many candidates as seats, with half the candidates nominated by the Seanad and the other half by the Dail. Sitting Senators lost the automatic right to renominate themselves. (The minimum age for candidates was now reduced to 30.)
Fairness of representation: Elections on a single nationwide constituency, whether direct or indirect, cannot be subject to gerrymandering or malapportionment.
The start-up and post 1928 composition both suffer from the dangers of duplicating the lower house. The prime ministerial nominations in 1922 and the election of 1925 diluted this a bit. Having the Seanad directly involved in nominating so many candidates for itself is also a tendency towards perpetuation.
The rights of parties who opt to abstain is always contentious, but it's worth noting that the decision by the anti-Treaty rump of Sinn Féin to boycott the Dail meant that it was not represented in the Seanad either. When most of Sinn Féin left to form Fianna Fáil and took their seats in the Dail this began to be corrected, but to a large extent the conflict between the Fianna Fáil government of 1932 onwards and the Seanad was rooted in the former's unrepresentation in the upper house.
The 1925 election saw a number of candidates elected who either benefitted from a very high local turnout (compared to a low statewide turnout) or who had the support of geographically scattered groups such as ex-servicemen or publicans. Such interest groups are traditionally badly represented in constituency based parliaments.
In light of later proposals and actions regarding the modern Seanad's composition it's worth explicitly noting that there was no direct representation for either Northern Ireland or the Irish emigrants. (This is something I'll come back to when looking at the present Seanad.) However there was nothing specifically stopping a candidate from Northern Ireland being put forward.
Powers and conventions: Originally: The Seanad could only delay, not veto legislation. However it could delay a money bill for 21 days and any other bill for 270 days. The Seanad had the power to call a binding referendum on any bill if a majority requested it within seven days of passing or if 60% of Senators requested it within ninety days. (5% of registered voters could also petition for a referendum but that's outside this scope.) This didn't cover either money bills or bills declared by both houses to be "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety". No referendum was called while this power existed.
From 1928: The power to call a referendum was scrapped. The power to delay ordinary bills was extended to twenty months.
Conflict resolution: As the Seanad only had the power to delay, the Dail would normally eventually triumph in a dispute. Referring a bill to the people was one alternative, although this was never exercised. (It may well have been had the Seanad still had the power once Fianna Fáil were in power.) In 1936 following protracted disputes over constitutional changes, the Seanad itself was abolished - the ultimate in conflict resolution.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: As noted above, the initial boycott by what became Fianna Fáil meant that they and the votes that had sent them to the Dail were underrepresented in the Seanad for a decade after they ended the boycott. Now one can quite legitimately argue that was a consequence of their own choice, but even after 1934 (when the entire Seanad had now been elected post boycott) there was still under representation stemming from the earlier boycott and the self-renewal process of the Seanad. At what point does a house stop being legitimately elected in a long period and become a hangover with an out of date mandate?
Because of the boycott it's hard to test the Seanad's effectiveness on its initial powers, but the ability to refer a bill to the people is one way to resist the partisan interests of a majority in a lower house. Post 1932 the Seanad was taking a firm stance against the Dail but was unable to prevent itself from being abolished - a short term protector at best.
Anything else?: The 1925 election is an interesting test of using STV under very extreme circumstances - electing 19 members from 76 candidates. This is even more complex than some Australian Senate elections (last time there were 78 candidates chasing 6 seats from New South Wales). One has to wonder if a 76 candidate preference ballot paper is "manageable" for the voters so that they can cast a vote that is successful in electing a member.
Anything worth copying?: Staggered elections are good, although I question if electing by a quarter isn't too long. The power to refer a bill to the people is a very good idea and one to allow for an upper house to go over the head of the fully single elected house. The post 1928 indirect elections don't fill me with much excitement though as such a system can make it very hard for a total renewal to take place and have some Senators with a very tenuous link to the votes that elected those who originally directly elected them. Also I don't think it wise to have a lower house involved in selecting any part of its own upper house.
Be warned that some of this is complicated as despite only lasting fourteen years it was subject to several constitutional amendments and effectively had three different (s)election systems over six elections in its life.
Composition: Start-up: 30 members elected by Dáil Éireann, with terms of three or nine years allocated by lot. 30 members appointed by the prime minister for six or twelve year terms. These arrangements were just to get things going.
As originally envisaged for permanent running: Members would serve for twelve years, with a third (fifteen) directly elected in a state wide Single Transferable Vote election.
The nomination process was complicated to say the least. Candidates would be nominated in three sections - senators up for re-election could renominate themselves; the Seanad as a whole then selected an equal number of candidates from a list submitted; and then the Dail selected a number equal to both the renominations and Seanad selection. (See Northern Ireland Elections: "An exceedingly severe test" - The Irish Senate elections of 1925 for more details of the one election that did take place.) Interim vacancies were filled by a vote of the Seanad; however the Senator would only serve until the next set of Seanad elections. (Also candidates had to be at least 35.)
Following changes in 1928: Direct elections were done away with and terms reduced to 9 years. The Seanad was now elected by thirds, with the outgoing Seanad and the Dail jointly voting by STV. The nominations were also changed so there would now be twice as many candidates as seats, with half the candidates nominated by the Seanad and the other half by the Dail. Sitting Senators lost the automatic right to renominate themselves. (The minimum age for candidates was now reduced to 30.)
Fairness of representation: Elections on a single nationwide constituency, whether direct or indirect, cannot be subject to gerrymandering or malapportionment.
The start-up and post 1928 composition both suffer from the dangers of duplicating the lower house. The prime ministerial nominations in 1922 and the election of 1925 diluted this a bit. Having the Seanad directly involved in nominating so many candidates for itself is also a tendency towards perpetuation.
The rights of parties who opt to abstain is always contentious, but it's worth noting that the decision by the anti-Treaty rump of Sinn Féin to boycott the Dail meant that it was not represented in the Seanad either. When most of Sinn Féin left to form Fianna Fáil and took their seats in the Dail this began to be corrected, but to a large extent the conflict between the Fianna Fáil government of 1932 onwards and the Seanad was rooted in the former's unrepresentation in the upper house.
The 1925 election saw a number of candidates elected who either benefitted from a very high local turnout (compared to a low statewide turnout) or who had the support of geographically scattered groups such as ex-servicemen or publicans. Such interest groups are traditionally badly represented in constituency based parliaments.
In light of later proposals and actions regarding the modern Seanad's composition it's worth explicitly noting that there was no direct representation for either Northern Ireland or the Irish emigrants. (This is something I'll come back to when looking at the present Seanad.) However there was nothing specifically stopping a candidate from Northern Ireland being put forward.
Powers and conventions: Originally: The Seanad could only delay, not veto legislation. However it could delay a money bill for 21 days and any other bill for 270 days. The Seanad had the power to call a binding referendum on any bill if a majority requested it within seven days of passing or if 60% of Senators requested it within ninety days. (5% of registered voters could also petition for a referendum but that's outside this scope.) This didn't cover either money bills or bills declared by both houses to be "necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety". No referendum was called while this power existed.
From 1928: The power to call a referendum was scrapped. The power to delay ordinary bills was extended to twenty months.
Conflict resolution: As the Seanad only had the power to delay, the Dail would normally eventually triumph in a dispute. Referring a bill to the people was one alternative, although this was never exercised. (It may well have been had the Seanad still had the power once Fianna Fáil were in power.) In 1936 following protracted disputes over constitutional changes, the Seanad itself was abolished - the ultimate in conflict resolution.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: As noted above, the initial boycott by what became Fianna Fáil meant that they and the votes that had sent them to the Dail were underrepresented in the Seanad for a decade after they ended the boycott. Now one can quite legitimately argue that was a consequence of their own choice, but even after 1934 (when the entire Seanad had now been elected post boycott) there was still under representation stemming from the earlier boycott and the self-renewal process of the Seanad. At what point does a house stop being legitimately elected in a long period and become a hangover with an out of date mandate?
Because of the boycott it's hard to test the Seanad's effectiveness on its initial powers, but the ability to refer a bill to the people is one way to resist the partisan interests of a majority in a lower house. Post 1932 the Seanad was taking a firm stance against the Dail but was unable to prevent itself from being abolished - a short term protector at best.
Anything else?: The 1925 election is an interesting test of using STV under very extreme circumstances - electing 19 members from 76 candidates. This is even more complex than some Australian Senate elections (last time there were 78 candidates chasing 6 seats from New South Wales). One has to wonder if a 76 candidate preference ballot paper is "manageable" for the voters so that they can cast a vote that is successful in electing a member.
Anything worth copying?: Staggered elections are good, although I question if electing by a quarter isn't too long. The power to refer a bill to the people is a very good idea and one to allow for an upper house to go over the head of the fully single elected house. The post 1928 indirect elections don't fill me with much excitement though as such a system can make it very hard for a total renewal to take place and have some Senators with a very tenuous link to the votes that elected those who originally directly elected them. Also I don't think it wise to have a lower house involved in selecting any part of its own upper house.
Monday, July 23, 2007
On second chambers: The Senate of Northern Ireland
To kick off this look at second chambers around the world past and present, let's look at the one other that has existed in the United Kingdom, the Senate of Northern Ireland which existed between 1921 and 1972.
As a brief disclaimer, I'm going to avoid wider issues such as gerrymandering, and the local government franchise. Whilst they were definitely part of the Stormont regime (although some of the gerrymandering originated at local level, though later reinforced by the Stormont government), they were not part of the Senate per se and can distort discussion of the structure.
Composition: 26 members (25 in practice from 1969). 24 elected by Single Transferable Vote by members of the Northern Ireland House of Commons with 12 elected at the start of each Parliament for two terms. The other two were the Lord Mayors of Belfast and Londonderry ex officio. In 1969 the Londonderry Corporation was suspended and no new elected body introduced before Stormont was prorogued. The Lord Mayor of Londonderry's seat was not filled.
Fairness of representation: One obvious distortion is that whilst the two county boroughs were directly represented, the six county council areas were not. (The gerrymandering of the Londonderry Corporation is widely known, but as the Mayor was elected by the councillors this point is perhaps beyond the scope of this analysis.) It's not clear at a glance if the Mayors were there to represent their cities, their councils, just the majorities on their councils or the people of the cities - four distinct (if sometimes confused) concepts. The 12 members elected at the start of each Parliament were elected by sitting members of the House of Commons. Abstenionist MPs thus did not have the opportunity to elect (abstentionist) Senators. Approximately 4 MPs were needed to elect 1 Senator, although with a sizable abstention this could reduce the quota. Micro parties in the Commons (and there were a number in the history of Stormont) would thus not be represented in the Senate unless they could band together. Consequently the 12 elected would be disproportionately representative of the larger parties in the Commons.
The precise political composition is not recorded as interest in the Senate was low but given the limited participation in the Commons by Nationalists, the fragmentation of opposition parties in the Commons and the addition of the Lord Mayors the chamber would have been even more Unionist dominated than the Commons.
The method for handling midterm vacancies isn't currently recorded on either webpage I'm linking to. Was there a convention that an opposition party with a vacancy could nominate a replacement unopposed?
Powers and conventions: I'm not too sure on these, although the Senate was regarded as "not designed to be a check on the legislature, but rather a place for reflection and revision of government bills - an additional means of finding parliamentary time" (Northern Ireland Elections: The Northern Ireland Senate, 1921-72) and in practice had virtually no political impact.
Conflict resolution: Again details are limited, especially as the Senate was never set up to be a check & balance on the Commons, whilst as both chambers were always controlled by the same party the potential for party conflict was minimal.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: This is rather more theoretical (especially given the limited information on powers and the lack of any reason to use them), but in terms of its composition the Senate could potentially have been a protector without being too much of a block to overwhelming changes in public opinion. As its composition reflected the outcome of two general elections it could resist a small change in opinion altering the balance of power in the Commons as at no point was even a bare majority of the Senate elected in one go. By contrast a landslide sweep of the Commons would bring with it many Senate seats and so securing a Senate majority would be possible for a new government with mass popular support. And as a government can call an election, what would there be to stop a new one calling an early election just to ensure it could get a majority in the upper house?
Because almost all the Senate was elected by the House of Commons, there was no opportunity for voters to "ticket split" and elect one party to a Commons majority and another to keep a check on them. And in any case it takes more than just composition but also actual powers for an upper house to take on the lower.
Anything else?: The Senate was created as an afterthought and it shows. Originally there would have been a single Senate for both Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland, but during the Government of Ireland Bill's passage through the Westminster Parliament this was amended to create separate Senates. (Northern Ireland Elections: The Senate of Southern Ireland, 1921) "Of course it developed into a sinecure for politicians who couldn't or wouldn't get into the lower house." (The Northern Ireland Senate. Op cit.) As early as 1926 there were calls for its abolition.
Anything worth copying?: Very little to be honest. The one point worth taking on board is the staggered elections. But having the upper house elected directly by the lower house is not particularly attractive as it primarily duplicates the lower house's composition, as well as creating opening for sinecures and placemen. And it is vulnerable to the ability of governments (or lower houses) to call a new election.
The inclusion of the two Mayors provided a link to local government, but it is a distortion of the role - Mayors are primarily chosen for civic municipal duties, not sitting in legislatures. (Executive Mayors, like the directly elected Mayors we now have in some areas, are as the name suggests executives, not legislators.) The idea of rotating mayoralties further makes it difficult to use them for a legislature as there is the risk a person will be chosen as Mayor for the sake of the legislature, not the municipality.
As a brief disclaimer, I'm going to avoid wider issues such as gerrymandering, and the local government franchise. Whilst they were definitely part of the Stormont regime (although some of the gerrymandering originated at local level, though later reinforced by the Stormont government), they were not part of the Senate per se and can distort discussion of the structure.
Composition: 26 members (25 in practice from 1969). 24 elected by Single Transferable Vote by members of the Northern Ireland House of Commons with 12 elected at the start of each Parliament for two terms. The other two were the Lord Mayors of Belfast and Londonderry ex officio. In 1969 the Londonderry Corporation was suspended and no new elected body introduced before Stormont was prorogued. The Lord Mayor of Londonderry's seat was not filled.
Fairness of representation: One obvious distortion is that whilst the two county boroughs were directly represented, the six county council areas were not. (The gerrymandering of the Londonderry Corporation is widely known, but as the Mayor was elected by the councillors this point is perhaps beyond the scope of this analysis.) It's not clear at a glance if the Mayors were there to represent their cities, their councils, just the majorities on their councils or the people of the cities - four distinct (if sometimes confused) concepts. The 12 members elected at the start of each Parliament were elected by sitting members of the House of Commons. Abstenionist MPs thus did not have the opportunity to elect (abstentionist) Senators. Approximately 4 MPs were needed to elect 1 Senator, although with a sizable abstention this could reduce the quota. Micro parties in the Commons (and there were a number in the history of Stormont) would thus not be represented in the Senate unless they could band together. Consequently the 12 elected would be disproportionately representative of the larger parties in the Commons.
The precise political composition is not recorded as interest in the Senate was low but given the limited participation in the Commons by Nationalists, the fragmentation of opposition parties in the Commons and the addition of the Lord Mayors the chamber would have been even more Unionist dominated than the Commons.
The method for handling midterm vacancies isn't currently recorded on either webpage I'm linking to. Was there a convention that an opposition party with a vacancy could nominate a replacement unopposed?
Powers and conventions: I'm not too sure on these, although the Senate was regarded as "not designed to be a check on the legislature, but rather a place for reflection and revision of government bills - an additional means of finding parliamentary time" (Northern Ireland Elections: The Northern Ireland Senate, 1921-72) and in practice had virtually no political impact.
Conflict resolution: Again details are limited, especially as the Senate was never set up to be a check & balance on the Commons, whilst as both chambers were always controlled by the same party the potential for party conflict was minimal.
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: This is rather more theoretical (especially given the limited information on powers and the lack of any reason to use them), but in terms of its composition the Senate could potentially have been a protector without being too much of a block to overwhelming changes in public opinion. As its composition reflected the outcome of two general elections it could resist a small change in opinion altering the balance of power in the Commons as at no point was even a bare majority of the Senate elected in one go. By contrast a landslide sweep of the Commons would bring with it many Senate seats and so securing a Senate majority would be possible for a new government with mass popular support. And as a government can call an election, what would there be to stop a new one calling an early election just to ensure it could get a majority in the upper house?
Because almost all the Senate was elected by the House of Commons, there was no opportunity for voters to "ticket split" and elect one party to a Commons majority and another to keep a check on them. And in any case it takes more than just composition but also actual powers for an upper house to take on the lower.
Anything else?: The Senate was created as an afterthought and it shows. Originally there would have been a single Senate for both Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland, but during the Government of Ireland Bill's passage through the Westminster Parliament this was amended to create separate Senates. (Northern Ireland Elections: The Senate of Southern Ireland, 1921) "Of course it developed into a sinecure for politicians who couldn't or wouldn't get into the lower house." (The Northern Ireland Senate. Op cit.) As early as 1926 there were calls for its abolition.
Anything worth copying?: Very little to be honest. The one point worth taking on board is the staggered elections. But having the upper house elected directly by the lower house is not particularly attractive as it primarily duplicates the lower house's composition, as well as creating opening for sinecures and placemen. And it is vulnerable to the ability of governments (or lower houses) to call a new election.
The inclusion of the two Mayors provided a link to local government, but it is a distortion of the role - Mayors are primarily chosen for civic municipal duties, not sitting in legislatures. (Executive Mayors, like the directly elected Mayors we now have in some areas, are as the name suggests executives, not legislators.) The idea of rotating mayoralties further makes it difficult to use them for a legislature as there is the risk a person will be chosen as Mayor for the sake of the legislature, not the municipality.
On second chambers: An introduction
The reform of the House of Lords has dragged on for years, to the point that some temporary provisions have now become a total joke (look for instance at a by-election to replace a deceased Labour hereditary peer!). But reform is pressing - with such a large proportion of members now appointed and that appointments process becoming publicly discredited, the House of Lords presently is "broke" and does need "fixing".
The idea of this little series of posts is to look at some other second chambers around the world from the past and present and see how they were composed, how they performed and whether they might offer guidance for a replacement second chamber in the UK.
To guide the analysis each second chamber looked at will have the following sections:
Composition: As it says on the tin (with a brief history of any changes).
Fairness of representation: What basis is the representation built on? Is it natural? Is it fair?
(I'm deliberately avoiding the use of the term "malapportionment" because there is debate as to exactly what it means - just an "unfair ratio of representatives to voters" or "unfair allocation of representatives to represented"? As you'll see as we go through, it's not always clear precisely who or what is being "represented".)
Powers and conventions: What powers does the second chamber have on paper? And which does it actually exercise?
Conflict resolution: How are clashes between the two houses resolved?
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: How good are the chambers at responding to changes in popular opinion? How good are they are taking a longer term approach?
Anything else?: As it says.
Anything worth copying?: How far might this second chamber model work in the UK?
This will be by no means a complete tour but a search through some. I'll post my thoughts on a potential replacement UK house later on.
The idea of this little series of posts is to look at some other second chambers around the world from the past and present and see how they were composed, how they performed and whether they might offer guidance for a replacement second chamber in the UK.
To guide the analysis each second chamber looked at will have the following sections:
Composition: As it says on the tin (with a brief history of any changes).
Fairness of representation: What basis is the representation built on? Is it natural? Is it fair?
(I'm deliberately avoiding the use of the term "malapportionment" because there is debate as to exactly what it means - just an "unfair ratio of representatives to voters" or "unfair allocation of representatives to represented"? As you'll see as we go through, it's not always clear precisely who or what is being "represented".)
Powers and conventions: What powers does the second chamber have on paper? And which does it actually exercise?
Conflict resolution: How are clashes between the two houses resolved?
Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: How good are the chambers at responding to changes in popular opinion? How good are they are taking a longer term approach?
Anything else?: As it says.
Anything worth copying?: How far might this second chamber model work in the UK?
This will be by no means a complete tour but a search through some. I'll post my thoughts on a potential replacement UK house later on.
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