Showing posts with label Gough Whitlam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gough Whitlam. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 21, 2014

Gough Whitlam 1916-2014

Gough Whitlam is probably the most intensely studied of all Australian Prime Ministers, not just in his home country but around the world. In just three years he brought sweeping changes to Australia, whether in education, health, foreign affairs, relations with indigenous Australians, the government of the Northern Territory and so much more. Even the Queen's title was changed to be more Australian.

It is in constitutional affairs that Whitlam attracts much global attention. Literally from its very first moment to its very last his government saw precedents broken and argument ensued. Rather than wait the customary period to assemble a full ministry and take office, he instead had himself and his deputy sworn into no less than twenty-seven different posts just a few days after winning the 1972 election in order to hit the ground running and immediately start implementing the government's agenda. Over the next few years more precedents would be broken and the two sides of Australian politics would fiercely argue over what practices were fundamental constitutional conventions and which were optional agreements to be set aside as and when.

Throughout its three year life the Whitlam government struggled with a hostile majority in the Senate. More legislation was blocked in three years than in the entire preceding seventy-two years of the Australian federation. Not even a "double dissolution" - a full election of all seats in both houses - resolved the gridlock beyond a few individual bills being passed (though they included the introduction of universal health care). How casual Senate vacancies were filled became another battleground with both sides crying foul about particular vacancies in Queensland. And then the Senate obstructed Supply, leading to Whitlam's dramatic dismissal by the Governor General Sir John Kerr on 11 November 1975. (The above picture is of Kerr's Private Secretary, David Smith, reading out the proclamation of the dissolution of Parliament in less than ideal circumstances with Whitlam literally glaring over his shoulder.)

Beyond the personalities and the use of the reserve powers of the Governor General, the Dismissal was a struggle over competing visions of how parliamentary democracy works in an elected bicameral system. It was more than just a dispute over the specific issue of both houses having powers over supply - the Senate was blocking much other legislation as well - and went to the heart of democracy and mandates. Did a government with a solid majority in the House of Representatives have the right to govern or did the Senate have the right to veto bring it down? Which democratically elected body was more democratically elected? Was it right for an upper house to demand an early election just because the political wind was blowing the opposition's way? Those considering elections for the British House of Lords would do well to look at the struggle between the Senate and House of Representatives in the Whitlam era to see how conventions are not enough to prevent check & balance powers being used for naked partisan aims.

The disputes about 1975 will last forever. Whitlam is probably arguing about it with Kerr right now. On this mortal coil we must look to see how these messes can be avoided.

Monday, September 30, 2013

Bicameral deadlocks

As I write this, the US Congress is still in deadlock as the two chambers disagree over the budget, with the potential for the federal government to be shut down. Each chamber can claim a democratic mandate (although how an overall minority can veto an overwhelming majority's desire to even debate a measure is interesting - News from ME: Majority Rules, Minority Drools has more about the "the Hastert Rule") and add in the President's democratic mandate and there's not a great deal of progess.

Second chamber reformers here rarely want to give the Lords (or Senate or whatever they want to call it) budget powers but that doesn't mean there's any less of a risk of a deadlock between the two over some other key legislation. It's often forgotten that when the Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam was dismissed there were no less than twenty-one pieces of legislation other than supply in formal dispute between the two houses, or that the previous year key legislation such as universal healthcare insurance had only been got onto the statute book through the nuclear option of a snap "double dissolution" election of the whole parliament. It may be budgets in one place and time and healthcare in another and doubtlessly a different issue in a third but the problem remains that when multiple elements in the system claim separate democratic mandates the result can be a recipe for gridlock and chaos.

Friday, August 03, 2007

On second chambers: The Senate of Australia

Continuing my look at second chambers around the world, we now turn to look at the Australian Senate.

Composition: 76 members. 12 from each of the six states and two from the two territories, elected as follows:
*Under the normal electoral cycle: Only 6 of the senators from each state are elected at each "half-election", serving for two three year terms. All the Senators from the territories are elected in a normal "half-election". The terms are fixed; however the timing of the elections is sufficiently flexible that most elections for the House of Representatives are timed to overlap with a Senate election.
*In a "double dissolution": As part of the conflict resolution mechanism (which I'll come to below), the entire Senate is dissolved and put up for re-election, alongside the House of Representatives.
Election is by Single Transferable Vote. The number of candidates can immense - at the last election there were 78 standing in New South Wales. Australia has compulsory voting and it is compulsory for a voter to deploy all their preferences. A voter has two ways to cast a vote. They either rank all candidates in order of preference (yes even if there are 78!), and remember they've also just preferenced a House vote. Now you can understand the value of "How To Vote" cards recommending an order of preference. Or they can formally opt to have their vote redistributed in accordance with an order lodged by a party - for this they just mark a box "above the line". It's controversial in some quarters, especially due to horse trading, but frankly it's just a quicker way to vote the way a party suggests than copying out the How To Vote card.

The other point of note is how mid-term vacancies are filled. Until 1977 a state legislature would just appoint a replacement, with an unwritten convention that they appoint the nominee of the ex Senator's party. In 1975 (and we'll be hearing a lot about 1975 as we go) this convention was breached twice (and altered the balance of power in the Senate). A 1977 constitutional amendment now requires the new Senator to be from the same party, but doesn't require them to be the party's nominee. And some state legislatures have just declined to appoint a new Senator, leaving the seat vacant.

Fairness of representation: As I've said before, it's not always clear exactly what is the basis of representation in upper houses so the term "malapportionment" is best avoided. Depending upon how you look at it, the Senate either has a very fair representation for the states, with all having the same number of Senators, or a very bad voter-representative ratio with Senators from Tasmania representing an electorate many times smaller than those from New South Wales.

In a federal system a bicameral legislature with one chamber based on equal representation for the people and the other on equal representation for the states has some merits. However as the Senate is directly elected (as opposed to, say, the Bundesrat in Germany, which I'll look at in another post) and partisan it's questionable as to whether or not Senators are always acting in the interests of their state or their party.

The territories are the weak point in this as they don't get equal representation (but have even smaller populations). And when the Northern Territory was offered statehood in a referendum in 1998 it was only offered 3 Senators, rather than 12. What would be patently unfair would be for the original states to have more Senators just because they were the first in the federation.

Powers and conventions: The Senate is extremely powerful by the standards of second chambers and it's not for nothing that the term "Washminster System" is sometimes used in place of Westminster System. The Senate has near equal powers to the House of Representatives. Budgets ("Supply") and Appropriation Bills must originate in the House and cannot be amended by the Senate, but otherwise the Senate is in quite a strong position. It can reject Bills outright, unless the government initiates the double dissolution process (again, more on this later).

One particular point of note is that the Senate has the power to reject Supply. This is one of the most contentious matters. In practice the Senate has almost always not exercised the powers, and for most of the last 32 years the Senate has either been controlled by the government of the day or had the balance of power held by a party with an explicit stance against exercising the power to block Supply.

But in 1975, the one year in which the Senate did block Supply, constitutional chaos ensued. Strictly speaking the Senate didn't vote down Supply but rather passed deferral motions and set on a confrontational course with the House of Representatives and the government, who held office by virtue of their majority there.

Conflict resolution: A formal mechanism is built in, with the presumption that the House will prevail if it's the will of the people. If the Senate repeatedly refuses to pass a Bill, the government can advise the Governor General to call a double dissolution in which both the House and Senate face re-election by the people. (In practice a government will store up several bills and take them all to the people in one double dissolution.) Then a special joint session of House and Senate is called and the final fate of the Bills is settled there. The House generally has about double the number of members the Senate has, so is expected to prevail in a joint sitting. (In practice only one joint sitting has been held, in 1974, with the other double dissolutions leading to either the incumbent government losing power, gaining a majority in the Senate or not having the numbers to win a joint sitting.)

The situation in 1975 was more complicated, with both the Senate and government of Gough Whitlam standing firm. Whitlam asserted the Senate were challenging the more legitimate House and should pass the Budget, the Liberal-Country controlled Senate demanded a new election in the hope of gaining power for themselves. In the end the Governor General dismissed Whitlam and appointed the Liberal leader, Malcolm Fraser, as Prime Minister. This was the most controversial event in the political history of Australia and ever since there has been no real consensus on a way to resolve the issues involved.

Protector against the tyranny of the majority vs bastion against democracy: A tricky one this. In recent years the Senate has generally had no one party majority (although the last election proved a narrow exception) and so governments have not had free reign. However when an opposition party can secure a majority - and as well as at an election this can happen if state legislatures refuse to appoint replacement senators for government vacancies - then it can set on a course on confrontation.

Since the double dissolution takes the entire Parliament, house and both halves of the Senate et al, to the electorate it is in theory hard for the Senate to frustrate the will of the people long term. However if the elected government doesn't have a majority in the new Senate or the numbers to win in a joint sitting then it can't get its way. This should be because of ticket splitting and voter caution, though given the different voter-representative ratios in the Senate it is entirely possible for every voter to vote the same way for both chambers and still return different majorities.

And of course 1975 shows the dangers when a Senate feels confident to take on the House and both government & Senate adopt a strategy of waiting for the other side to crack.

Anything else?: Everything above here pretty much sums it up. But see the end of the piece for more about 1975 for those who don't know the full gory story.

Anything worth copying?: Hmm... Staggered elections, multi-member constituencies and stronger powers with a clearly defined resolution mechanism are all very attractive. Less attractive is the ability to block supply and drive a government from office, but that could easily be denied in the creation of UK chamber. However the model of the chamber is very clearly one of representing clearly defined interests, not revising, and as the UK is not fully federal then these interests would be very hard to define. I can't envisage a chamber based on equal representation from England and Northern Ireland (to take the two extreme) would be workable. Equally I can't see giving the poorly defined English regions an equal number of members would be too popular with Scotland, Wales & Northern Ireland, and even within England there's also the issue of regions with smaller populations like the North East having the same number of members as the South East.

But the principle of an "equal say" second chamber could at least be a way to tackle other issues like the West Lothian Question.

Post Script: I've made many mentions of the events of 1975 so for those who aren't familiar with them, I'd recommend a look at Wikipedia: 1975 Australian constitutional crisis.

And also here's a special bonus feature from YouTube, featuring the satirical character Norman Gunston on that momentous day:

Isn't it incredible how open and relaxed the Australian political system was then? And even at the height of political battle the Aussies can still laugh!

Wednesday, June 27, 2007

Government - a one-man show?

This is the full list of government ministers on the 10 Downing Street website:

Her Majesty's Government
We will publish the official list of Her Majesty's Government as soon as it becomes available from 27 May [sic] 2007.

Cabinet
Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Minister for the Civil Service
Rt Hon Gordon Brown MP
Deputy Prime Minister and First Secretary of State
To be confirmed
Other Ministers
To be confirmed
Truly this is a very Brown government!

But once the posts have all been filled there will be many more names. Somehow I doubt we'll ever see a government as small as the following Australian ministry which held ofice from December 5 1972 to December 19 1972:

Prime Minister - Gough Whitlam
Minister for Foreign Affairs - Gough Whitlam
Treasurer - Gough Whitlam
Attorney-General - Gough Whitlam
Minister for Customs and Excise - Gough Whitlam
Minister for Trade and Industry - Gough Whitlam
Minister for Shipping and Transport - Gough Whitlam
Minister for Education and Science - Gough Whitlam
Minister for Civil Aviation - Gough Whitlam
Minister for Housing - Gough Whitlam
Minister for Works - Gough Whitlam
Minister for External Territories - Gough Whitlam
Minister for Environment, Aborigines and the Arts - Gough Whitlam
Deputy Prime Minister - Lance Barnard
Minister for Defence - Lance Barnard
Minister for Supply - Lance Barnard
Minister for the Army - Lance Barnard
Minister for the Navy - Lance Barnard
Minister for Air - Lance Barnard
Postmaster-General - Lance Barnard
Minister for Labour and National Service - Lance Barnard
Minister for Social Services - Lance Barnard
Minister for Immigration - Lance Barnard
Minister for the Interior - Lance Barnard
Minister for Primary Industry - Lance Barnard
Minister for Repatriation - Lance Barnard
Minister for Health - Lance Barnard
Minister for National Development - Lance Barnard

(Source: Wikipedia: First Whitlam Ministry)
Can this be beaten for the smallest government ever?

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